





























Allen et al. (2005)认为，中国经济的高速增长很难从正式的金融与法律制度中得到解释。为此，试图
洞悉中国经济发展和崛起之谜的学者们将研究的触角逐渐延伸至“关系”(guanxi) 视角，对政治联系 (Po-
litical Connections)的经济后果及其导致的企业行为异化保持了密切的关注。早期的相关文献主要关注印




















































































































































RDDUM= α0 + α1PCLAG+ α2HHI5+ α3PLU+ α4 INDR+ α5LNSIZE+ α6LEV
+α7ROALAG+ α8OCFLAG+ α9Tobin'Q+ α10LISTAGE+ α11STATE+ α12MKT
+λIND+ωYEAR+ ε
(1)
RD/R= β0 + β1PCLAG+ β2HHI5+ β3PLU+ β4 INDR+ β5LNSIZE+ β6LEV













































滞后一期的经营活动现金流÷期初的总资产(Bhagat and Welch,1995；Fazzari et al.,1988)。
(流通股×年末股票价格+非流通股×每股净资产+负债总额) /企业总资产的账面价值，用以衡量企业








































































上市公司R&D支出金额仅大约占销售收入的 0.37%，最大比例约为 13.90%，最小的为 0。PCLAG均值为
0.2203，说明22.03%的中国上市公司的关键高管具有政治联系。
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控制变量方面，HHI5的结果表明，中国上市公司的股权集中度差异很大，最大为 72.65%、最小仅为






























































































































































































Hall and Oriani (2006)，在进行相关的多元回归分析之前，首先利用如下的Probit模型(3)、判断本文样本是
否存在选择偏差：
DISCLOSE= γ0 + γ1 INDRD+ γ2 INCREA+ γ3LNSIZE+ γ4LEV+ωYEAR+ ψ (3)
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Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of political connections as an informal institution on R&D investment behavior of
Chinese listed firms. Using a hand-collected sample including R&D data and political connections data of key top managers of
listed firms from 2004-2009, this paper empirically studies whether and how political connections of key top managers curb
R&D investment of Chinese listed firms. The results show that politically connected firms have a significantly lower probabili-
ty of investing on R&D, and significantly less intensity of R&D investment, suggesting that political connections do curb sig-
nificantly R&D investment. Furthermore, compared to non-state-owned listed firms, political connections curb significantly
R&D investment of state-owned listed firms, and political connections only curb significantly R&D investment of high-tech list-
ed firms, compared to non-high-tech listed firms.
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